








































If	 we	 want	 to	 be	 non-committal	 about	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 patch,	 perhaps	 to	 allow	 that	 you	 are	






I’ve	been	 interested	 for	a	while	 in	what	we	mean	by	 these	sentences.	More	generally,	 in	what	we	
mean	 by	 ‘look’	 sentences	 when	 we	 use	 them	 to	 describe	 our	 colour	 experiences.	 Even	 more	
generally,	in	what	we	mean	by	‘look’	sentences	when	we	use	them	to	describe	our	visual	experiences	
as	a	whole.	 I	call	 these	uses	visual	experience	uses	of	 ‘look’	sentences.	Not	all	of	our	uses	of	 ‘look’	
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of	 ‘The	patch	 looks	grey	to	you’	 to	describe	your	visual	experience	of	 the	patch	at	 the	start	of	 this	
chapter.	
	




















By	 ‘grey’	we	mean	 the	property	of	occurring	 in	a	certain	way.	 Looking	events,	 like	events	of	many	
other	kinds,	occur	in	various	ways.	What	is	it	for	a	looking	event	to	occur	in	a	certain	way?	The	kind	




that	 we	 mean	 by	 ‘grey’.	 That	 is,	 the	 conjunction	 of	 the	 property	 of	 being	 a	 looking	 event	 and	
occurring	now	and	the	property	of	occurring	in	way	w.	That	is,	the	property	of	being	a	looking	event	
and	occurring	now	and	occurring	in	way	w.	We	use	‘grey’	because	the	patch	looks	to	you	the	way	it	





to	 you’.	 By	 ‘to	 you’	 we	 mean	 the	 property	 of	 having	 you	 as	 an	 experiencer	 (someone	 who	 is	
experiencing	 the	 event).	 By	 ‘looks	 grey	 to	 you’	we	mean	 the	 conjunction	 of	 the	 property	 that	we	
mean	 by	 ‘looks	 grey’	 and	 the	 property	 that	 we	mean	 by	 ‘to	 you’.	 That	 is,	 the	 conjunction	 of	 the	
property	 of	 being	 a	 looking	 event	 and	occurring	 now	and	occurring	 in	way	w	 and	 the	property	 of	
having	you	as	an	experiencer.	That	is,	the	property	of	being	a	looking	event	and	occurring	now	and	
occurring	in	way	w	and	having	you	as	an	experiencer.	We	use	‘to	you’	because	we	are	talking	about	






that	we	mean	 by	 ‘looks	 grey	 to	 you’	 and	 the	 property	 that	we	mean	 by	 ‘The	 patch’.	 That	 is,	 the	
property	of	being	a	 looking	event	and	occurring	now	and	occurring	 in	way	w	and	having	you	as	an	
experiencer	 and	 the	 property	 of	 having	 the	 patch	 as	 a	 stimulus.	 That	 is,	 the	 property	 of	 being	 a	
looking	 event	 and	 occurring	 now	 and	 occurring	 in	 way	 w	 and	 having	 you	 as	 an	 experiencer	 and	












might	 refer	 to	 it	 as:	 the	 way	 w	 such	 that	 it	 is	 generically	 true	 that	 grey	 things	 look	 w.	 Or,	 less	
ambiguously,	as:	the	way	w	such	that	it	is	generically	true	that	looking	events	whose	stimulus	is	grey	













general	 mechanism	 that	 we	 have	 for	 using	 adjectives	 to	 mean	 ways	 of	 occurring.	 We	 might	 use	
‘proud’	in	‘John	walks	proud’,	for	example,	to	mean	a	certain	way	of	walking	(the	maximally	specific	




It	 is	 convenient	 to	 say	 that	by	 ‘grey’	 in	 ‘The	patch	 looks	 grey	 to	 you’	we	mean:	 the	way	 that	 grey	
things	look.	But	care	needs	to	be	taken	here.	One	might	wonder,	given	that	grey	things	look	all	sorts	
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of	ways	 in	different	conditions,	whether	there	 is	such	a	thing	as	the	way	that	grey	things	 look.	But	
‘the	way	grey	 things	 look’	 is	 shorthand	 for	 ‘the	maximally	 specific	way	w	such	 that	 it	 is	generically	
true	 that	 looking	events	whose	stimulus	 is	grey	occur	 in	way	w’,	and	 if	 this	 is	properly	understood	
then	it	is	quite	plausible	that	there	is	such	a	way.	First,	whether	it	is	generically	true	that	grey	things	
look	w	does	not	depend	on	how	grey	things	actually	look.	Compare	turtles:	there	is	a	generic	reading	

























In	our	visual	experience	uses	of	 ‘look’	 sentences	we	use,	as	 the	complement	of	 ‘look’,	expressions	












Among	 the	 complements	 here	 are	 an	 adjective	 phrase	 (‘grey’),	 a	 noun	 phrase	 (‘a	 grey	 thing’),	 a	



















In	 these	 sentences	 we	 use	 complements	 from	 a	 variety	 of	 syntactic	 categories	 –	 a	 noun	 phrase	
















































When	trying	to	paraphrase	 ‘look’	 in	each	case	 I	keep	coming	up	with	more	or	 less	 the	same	thing,	
something	like	‘visually	appears’.	
	
It	 is	 important	 that	 the	 task	 in	 each	 case	 is	 to	 paraphrase	 just	 the	 word	 ‘look’,	 not	 the	 whole	
sentence.	We	would	expect	there	to	be	differences	between	the	meanings	of	these	sentences	as	a	






Coming	 up	 with	 evidence	 from	 paraphrasing	 that	 a	 word	 is	 ambiguous	 might	 require	 us	 to	 be	
explicitly	aware	of	any	ambiguity,	so	perhaps	the	reason	why	there	is	no	evidence	from	paraphrasing	
that	‘look’	is	ambiguous	in	visual	experiences	uses	of	‘look’	sentences	is	not	that	it’s	not	ambiguous,	











It	 is	 important	 that	 the	 reading	 in	 question	 is	 made	 more	 salient	 by	 emphasising	 the	 second	
occurrence	 of	 ‘pick’,	 rather	 than	 by	 emphasising	 some	 other	 expression	 in	 the	 sentence.	 If	 there	
were	 a	 non-contradictory	 reading	 of	 the	 sentence	 that	 is	 made	more	 salient	 by	 emphasising	 the	
































flower	 to	his	 girlfriend;	he	doesn’t	 know	much	about	 flowers,	 so	his	mum	chooses	an	appropriate	
one	in	the	garden,	which	he	then	plucks;	but	he	does	know	a	lot	about	timing,	so	he	chooses	the	best	
moment	 to	give	 the	 flower.	There	 is	a	 reading	of	 the	 first	 sentence	below	on	which	 it	expresses	a	
proposition	 that	 is	 true	 in	 these	 circumstances.	 But	 any	 such	 reading	 of	 the	 conjunction-reduced	








We	 get	 the	 same	 phenomenon	 for	 ‘look’	 when	 considered	 in	 all	 of	 its	 uses.	 If	 John	 appeared	






























































I	 have	 argued	 that	 there	 is	 no	 evidence	 from	 syntactic	 variety,	 from	 paraphrasing,	 from	 non-
contradiction,	from	conjunction	reduction,	or	from	question	formation	that	we	use	‘look’	with	more	
than	one	meaning	in	our	visual	experience	uses	of	‘look’	sentences.	Perhaps	this	can	be	made	into	an	
argument	 for	 a	 stronger	 conclusion,	 that	we	don’t	 use	 ‘look’	with	more	 than	 one	meaning	 in	 our	








we	mean	anything	by	 them	that	 is	not	accounted	 for	by	 the	 theory	 that	 I	develop	 in	Breckenridge	
(2018)?	
	
I	will	 consider	a	 fairly	exhaustive	 list	of	purported	uses	of	 ‘look’	 sentences,	and	argue	 in	each	case	
that	either	(a)	we	have	no	such	use,	or	(b)	if	we	do	have	such	a	use	then	it	is	not	a	visual	experience	
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that	we	 sometimes	 use	 ‘look’	 sentences	 to	make	 tentative	 assertions.	 For	 example,	we	might	 use	
‘The	patch	looks	grey’	to	tentatively	assert	that	the	patch	is	grey.	If	we	use	‘The	patch	looks	grey’	to	















































because	 none	 of	 them	 is	 a	 use	 on	 which	 we	 describe	 visual	 experience.	We	might	 be	 describing	


















prefer	 ‘the	 way	 F	 things	 usually	 look	 in	 daylight’,	 or	 ‘the	 way	 F	 things	 usually	 look	 in	 standard	
conditions’.	Dretske	would	add	reference	to	an	observer,	and	also	his	 ‘discriminatory	clause’:	by	‘O	
looks	F	to	S’	we	mean	that	O	looks	to	S	the	way	F	things	normally	look	to	S,	and	O	looks	different	to	S	
















There	 is	 a	use	of	 ‘O	 looks	 F	 to	 S’	on	which	we	mean	 that	 S’s	 visual	 experience	of	O,	or	 some	
feature	of	the	experience,	is	F	
	




I	 take	 it	 that	 if	we	do	have	such	a	use	 then	 it	 is	with	a	 restricted	class	of	 complements	of	 ‘look’	–	
colour	 adjectives	 such	 as	 ‘grey’,	 and	 perhaps	 also	 shape	 adjectives	 such	 as	 ‘square’.	 It	 would	 be	
implausible	 to	extend	 it	 to	adjectives	 such	as	 ‘heavy’	–	 it	 is	 implausible	 that	 there	 is	 a	use	of	 ‘The	














Chisholm	(1965,	pp.	50-3)	discusses	 ‘appear’	rather	than	‘look’.	 I	 take	 it	that	he	would	be	happy	to	

















The	 reason	 why	 it	 has	 these	 two	 readings,	 Chisholm	 seems	 to	 think,	 is	 that	 ‘look’	 itself	 has	 two	
readings	–	 it	can	be	read	 in	the	comparative	sense,	but	also	 in	a	distinct	phenomenal	sense.	When	
‘look’	is	read	in	its	comparative	sense,	to	look	grey	in	daylight	is	to	look	the	way	things	which	are	grey	
usually	 look	 in	 daylight,	 and	 this	 accounts	 for	 the	 analytic	 reading.	 When	 ‘look’	 is	 read	 in	 its	
phenomenal	sense,	however,	 ‘looks	grey’	 is	an	unanalysable	predicate,	and	 it	 is	this	sense	of	 ‘look’	
that	accounts	for	the	synthetic	reading.	
	




Leeds	 suggests,	 and	 I	 agree	 with	 him,	 that	 talk	 about	 the	 sentence	 being	 ambiguous	 between	









false	 reading,	 and	 this	 is	 because	 ‘look’	 is	 ambiguous,	 between	 a	 comparative	 sense	 and	 a	
phenomenal	sense.	
	
The	 problem	 for	 Chisholm	 is	 that	 if	 there	 is	 a	 comparative	 reading	 of	 ‘look’	which	 is	 as	 Chisholm	










































There	 is	a	reading	of	the	first	sentence	above	on	which	 it	 is	 informative;	but	there	 is	no	reading	of	
















In	 the	 same	way,	 the	 second	 sentence	 above	 has	 a	 reading	 on	which	 it	 is	 informative,	 a	 reading	
which	can	be	given	as	follows:	
		















reference	to	beliefs;	 if	 this	were	the	comparative	use	then	what	we	mean	by	 ‘The	patch	 looks	
grey’	 could	 be	 given	 by	 reference	 to	 the	way	 grey	 things	 look	 to	 certain	 observers	 in	 certain	
conditions,	so	 it	 is	not	the	comparative	use;	 if	 it	were	the	 inclination-to-believe	use	then	what	
we	 mean	 by	 ‘The	 patch	 looks	 grey’	 could	 be	 given	 by	 reference	 to	 beliefs,	 so	 it	 is	 not	 the	




















you	 the	 way	 grey	 things	 look,	 where	 ‘the	 way	 grey	 things	 look’	 is	 to	 be	 understood	 generically.	
Jackson’s	 arguments	 do	 not	 work	 against	 this	 account	 of	 the	 comparative	 use.	 I	 will	 consider	
Jackson’s	 argument	 that	 what	 we	 mean	 by	 ‘The	 patch	 looks	 grey	 to	 you’	 cannot	 be	 given	 by	
reference	to	the	way	grey	things	 look	to	certain	observers	 in	certain	conditions,	and	briefly	explain	



































He	 next	 considers	 explaining	 ‘normal	 circumstances’	 as	 being	 circumstances	 which	 best	 facilitate	
colour	discrimination.	But,	he	points	out,	these	are	circumstances	that	exaggerate	colour	differences,	







Jackson	 then	 argues	 that	 there	 is	 reason	 to	 think	 that	 the	 account	 cannot	 be	 right,	 for	 any	 actual	
observers	or	 actual	 circumstances.	 There	might	be	a	 shade	of	 colour,	 call	 it	 c,	 such	 that	 the	patch	
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looks	c	to	you	even	though	no	object	actually	is	c.	Then	it	would	be	true	that	the	patch	looks	c	to	you	
but	 not	 true	 that	 the	 patch	 looks	 the	 way	 c	 things	 look	 to	 you	 (or	 anyone	 else)	 in	 normal	
circumstances	(or	any	other	circumstances)	–	since	there	are	no	c	things	there	is	no	such	way.	This	
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